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Wiethaus, Ulrike, Ecstatic Transformation: Transpersonal Psychology in the Work of
Mechthild ofMagdeburg. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996.
Ulrike Wiethaus' ambitious goal is to make medieval mysticism intellectually
accessible to a modem western audience (2). To do this, she draws analogies
between modem psychologies open to the existence and significance of "altered
states of consciousness" and the accounts of ecstasies and visions within
Mechthild of Magdeburg's The Flowing Light of the Godhead. The study is divided
into two parts, the first focusing on ecstasy and the second on visions. After an
introduction in which Wiethaus outlines her method and makes some
preliminary claims about the context for Mechthild's book, Chapter 2 describes
Mechthild's understanding of ecstasy, particularly as found in Book 1 of The
Flowing Light. This is followed by two chapters describing contemporary
psychological accounts of ecstasy, in particular the work of humanistic
psychologists Abraham Maslow and Roberto Assagioli and the
psychotherapeutic approaches of Arthur Deikman and Claudio Naranjo.
Wiethaus suggests both the explanatory power of these models for
understanding and making accessible Mechthild's work and subjects the
contemporary psychologies to critique from the perspective of Mechthild's work.
Chapter 5 again returns to Mechthild, describing the visions found in Book 2 of
The Flowing Light. Wiethaus closes her book by arguing that contemporary
psychophysiological approaches to visionary phenomena offer fruitfulalthough crucially limited-modes of access to medieval experience.
This brief synopsis merely suggests the wide array of topics on which Wiethaus
touches in her brief book. She clearly knows The Flowing Light well, and offers
insightful readings of important aspects of the text. Any of a number of mystical
texts would have served for Wiethaus' project, yet I find her most compelling
when she focuses on the particularities of Mechthild's book. Although on first
reading I was troubled by Wiethaus' assertion that "self-actualization" and
"altered states of consciousness" could be taken as "approximate
twentieth-century equivalents" for medieval conceptions of deificatio, visio,
alienatio mentislfruitio/raptus, she is careful throughout her study to note both
points of analogy and disanalogy, reiterating the divide between Mechthild's text
and twentieth-century assumptions. Most crucially, Wiethaus keeps firmly in
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sight the divergence between Mechthild's belief in a deity that transcends
humanity and the human-centered work of contemporary psychologists.
What these contemporary psychologists offer, according to Wiethaus, is a way
for contemporary audiences to begin to understand the power, authority,
fruitfulness, and self-fulfillment Mechthild attained through her ecstasies and
visions. Yet understanding occurs through a thorough acquaintance with the
language and context of the text. For this reason, and despite my lack of
competence to judge the plausibility of the psychological theories Wiethaus
discusses, I remain unconvinced that she needs them to make her argument
about Mechthild's book or that contemporary explanatory theories can ever help
us understand medieval texts more fully. Modern psychology may offer causal
explanations of aspects of the text, but as Wayne Proudfoot shows in Religious
Experience, this is another project. Wiethaus is not always clear whether her
comparison of medieval and contemporary views is meant only to serve as an
illuminating analogy, or whether she understands modern psychological views
as explaining the medieval text in this more precise sense. As I will mention
again below, she suggests in places that modern views explain the physical
phenomena, while the understanding and significance of these phenomena
change in diverse historical and cultural contexts.
Some readers working on medieval mysticism may also question Wiethaus's
sharp distinction between ecstasies and visions. She recognizes that for many
medieval women the visionary imagination and ecstatic union merge, yet insists
that the enormous number of visions and auditions that occur in The Flowing
Light without mention of ecstatic transformation demands a differentiation
between the two phenomena (122-23). The point is well taken, yet the reader still
wonders about the relationship between the two.
This issue is raised again by Wiethaus's approach to The Flowing Light as a
whole. In her discussion of the text's ecstatic elements, particularly as found in
Book I, Wiethaus usefully argues that readers might best approach the book as
"a manual of ecstatic transformation" (33). Even more strongly, Wiethaus argues
that Mechthild "intended her writings as instructions for others rather than
objective descriptions of experiences" (81). In her reading of the visions of Book
2, however, Wiethaus giv~s a slightly different account of the text's genre and
intent; "Mechthild's ecstasies ... were intended to be reexperienced by her
audience, but visions were her exclusive and unique property" and merely
provided the reader with information (123). The claim that the visions are
intended to give practical moral and religious advice to a readership not graced
with such extraordinary experiences seems at odds with an account of the book
as a whole as "a manual for ecstatic transformation." Marianne Heimbach argues
for a tighter relationship between the ecstatic and the visionary within The
Flowing Light, both for the speaking "I" of the text and for the reader, in that the

visionary material gives the cosmological, theological, and practical elaboration
of and context out of which the ecstatic emerges and reemerges. Although
Heimbach may assert greater coherence to Mechthild's text than it possesses, as
one who knows the book well Wiethaus might usefully return to this question.
She suggests something like this relation, when she writes that "Mechthild
interpreted ecstasies as existentially and intellectually transformative events ...
Visions, on the other hand, are the medium in which the relationship between a
human being and the divine is translated back into the fabric of 'ordinary' life"
(121). Unlike Heimbach, however, Wiethaus denies the transformative quality of
visionary experience.
Wiethaus presents her work as preliminary and, like The Flowing Light itself,
open-ended. In that same spirit I would like to raise an issue broached in the final
pages of Wiethaus' study-one which I think warrants further reflection from
those interested in bringing together contemporary explanatory frameworks with
medieval texts. Throughout her study, Wiethaus assumes that some account of
experience--whether ecstatic or visionary---ean be unproblematically deduced
from the text. With regard to ecstasies Wiethaus reads Mechthild as guide and
theoretician, whereas the visionary accounts are taken as simply descriptive. Yet in
both instances, that which lies behind or beyond the text is deemed accessible to
the modern reader. Despite her attempt carefully to note analogies and
disanalogies between Mechthild's experience and that described in contemporary
psychologies, moreover, she does assert a common core of shared experience
untouched by the interpretative overlay of differing cultural contexts. In a move
markedly divergent from most of the perennialist philosophies with which she
shares this opinion, for example, Wiethaus equates the unchanging aspect of
visionary phenomena with the body and its significance with the influence of
religious and secular teachings and traditions (149).
In the final pages of her book Wiethaus briefly touches on the debates
surrounding the relationship between experience and interpretation recently
reopened by the work of philosopher of religion Steven Katz. She sides with
Peter Moore and Philip Almond, who argue, according to Wiethaus, that
"religious experience is crucially, but not necessarily, dependent on a belief
system" (613). I am not sure what the distinction is between "crucially" and
"necessarily," nor, more importantly, how religious experience can be identified
as such without some reference to systems of belief and practice. Moreover, both
Moore and Almond operate with a distinction between experience and
interpretation that has been subject to continued attack by philosophers of
religion interested in mysticism and religious experience. Given the intensity of
the debate and its extreme relevance to the questions Wiethaus raises, simply
asserting her agreement with Moore and Almond seems inadequate.
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As Frank Tobin has recently demonstrated in Mechthild ofMagdeburg: A Medieval
Mystic in Modern Eyes, a related debate runs through the work medievalists have
done on mystical and visionary literature. Here the argument is between
historians, who-to put the matter far more simply than do any of the scholars in
question-assert that we can talk about the mystical and visionary experience of
medieval men and women on the basis of textual accounts (Peter Dinzelbacher
and Caroline Walker Bynum) and literary historians who insist on the fictionality
and artfulness of medieval visionary, mystical, and hagiographicalliterature,
thereby calling into question the extent to which we can claim an historical
referent for the experiences recounted within them (Siegfried Ringler and Ursula
Peters). Wiethaus begins with a very perceptive account of the genre of
Mechthild's text, yet goes on to infer the nature of her experience without
adequate attention to the ways in which that experience has been textually
shaped. Or perhaps more aptly, Wiethaus sometimes reads Mechthild as a
theoretician of her own experience parallel to modern psychologists and
sometimes suggests that the textual shaping is the interpretative overlay beneath
which some "raw experience" can be discerned. Yet within the wealth of
material Wiethaus presents, I am not sure that she offers a theoretical account of
how this can be done. Perhaps before a fully compelling understanding of
Mechthild of Magdeburg's experience (and that described by contemporary
psychologists) can be attained, we need some theoretically plausible account of
the literary nature of her text, the degree to which it allows us to talk about her
experience, and the manner in which this process of recovery is to take place.
Such an exploration might also untangle the relationship between analogy,
understanding, and explanation in Wiethaus' thought-provoking work.

Amy M. Hollywood
Dartmouth College

m

